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ABSTRACT
A fundamental assumption in software security is that memory
contents do not change unless there is a legitimate deliberate mod-
ification. Classical fault attacks show that this assumption does
not hold if the attacker has physical access. Rowhammer attacks
showed that local code execution is already sufficient to break this
assumption. Rowhammer exploits parasitic effects in DRAM tomod-
ify the content of a memory cell without accessing it. Instead, other
memory locations are accessed at a high frequency. All Rowham-
mer attacks so far were local attacks, running either in a scripted
language or native code.
In this paper, we present Nethammer. Nethammer is the first truly
remote Rowhammer attack, without a single attacker-controlled
line of code on the targeted system. Systems that use uncached
memory or flush instructions while handling network requests,
e.g., for interaction with the network device, can be attacked using
Nethammer. Other systems can still be attacked if they are protected
with quality-of-service techniques like Intel CAT. We demonstrate
that the frequency of the cache misses is in all three cases high
enough to induce bit flips. We evaluated different bit flip scenar-
ios. Depending on the location, the bit flip compromises either the
security and integrity of the system and the data of its users, or it
can leave persistent damage on the system, i.e., persistent denial of
service.
We investigated Nethammer on personal computers, servers, and
mobile phones. Nethammer is a security landslide, making the for-
merly local attack a remote attack. With this work we invalidate all
defenses and mitigation strategies against Rowhammer build upon
the assumption of a local attacker. Consequently, this paradigm
shift impacts the security of millions of devices where the attacker
is not able to execute attacker-controlled code. Nethammer requires
threat models to be re-evaluated for most network-connected sys-
tems. We discuss state-of-the-art countermeasures and show that
most of them have no effect on our attack, including the target-
row-refresh (TRR) countermeasure of modern hardware.
Disclaimer: This work on Rowhammer attacks over the network
was conducted independently and unaware of other research groups
working on truly remote Rowhammer attacks. Experiments and
observations presented in this paper, predate the publication of the
Throwhammer attack by Tatar et al. [81]. We will thoroughly study
the differences between both papers and compare the advantages
and disadvantages in a future version of this paper.
1 INTRODUCTION
Hardware-fault attacks have been considered a security threat since
at least 1997 [12, 13]. In such attacks, the attacker intentionally
brings devices into physical conditions which are outside their
specification for a short time. For instance, this can be achieved by
temporarily using incorrect supply voltages, exposing them to high
or low temperature, exposing them to radiation, or by dismantling
the chip and shooting at it with lasers. Fault attacks typically re-
quire physical access to the device. However, if software can bring
the device to the border or outside of the specified operational
conditions, software-induced hardware faults are possible [50, 80].
The most prominent hardware fault which can be induced by
software is the Rowhammer bug, caused by a hardware reliability
issue of DRAM. An attacker can exploit this bug by repeatedly ac-
cessing (hammering) DRAM cells at a high frequency, causing unau-
thorized changes in physically adjacent memory locations. Since
its initial discovery as a security issue [50], Rowhammer’s ability
to defy abstraction barriers between different security domains
has been improved gradually to develop more powerful attacks
on various systems. Examples of previous attacks include privi-
lege escalation, from native environments [27, 78], from within a
browser’s sandbox [14, 25, 28], and from within virtual machines
running on third-party compute clouds [86], mounting fault attacks
on cryptographic primitives [11, 73], and obtaining root privileges
on mobile phones [84].
Most Rowhammer attacks assume that two DRAM rows must be
hammered to induce bit flips. The reason is that they assume that
an “open-page” memory controller policy is used, i.e., a DRAM row
is kept open until a different row is accessed. However, modern
CPUs employ more sophisticated memory controller policies that
preemptively close rows [27]. Based on this observation, Gruss
et al. [27] described a technique called one-location hammering.
In 2016, Intel introduced Cache Allocation Technology (CAT)
to address quality of service in multi-core server platforms [32].
Intel CAT allows restricting cache allocation of cores to a subset
of cache ways of the last-level cache, with the aim of optimizing
workloads in shared environments, e.g., protecting virtual machines
against performance degradation due to cache thrashing of a co-
located virtual machine. However, with a lower number of cache
ways available to the process, the probability to evict an address
by accessing other addresses increases significantly. Aga et al. [4]
showed that this facilitates eviction-based Rowhammer attacks.
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All previously known Rowhammer attacks required some form
of local code execution, e.g., JavaScript [14, 25, 28] or native code [4,
9, 11, 27, 50, 62, 69, 73, 78, 84, 86]. Moreover, all works on Rowham-
mer defenses assume that some form of local code execution is
required [9, 14, 15, 17, 18, 26, 29, 31, 43, 49, 50, 59, 67, 74, 91].
In particular, we found that none of these works even mentions
the theoretical possibility of truly non-local Rowhammer attacks.
Consequently, it was a widely accepted assumption that remote
Rowhammer attacks are not possible. More specifically, devices
where an attacker could not obtain local code execution were so
far considered to be safe. Yet, the following questions arise:
Are remote Rowhammer attacks possible? More specifically, is it
possible for an attacker to induce bit flips and exploit them, without
any local code execution on the system?
In this paper, we answer these questions and confirm that truly
remote Rowhammer attacks are possible. We present Nethammer,
the first Rowhammer attack that does not require local code execu-
tion. Nethammer requires only a fast network connection between
the attacker and victim. It sends a crafted stream of size-optimized
packets to the victim which causes a high number of memory ac-
cesses to the same set of memory locations. If the network driver or
other parts of the network stack use uncached memory or flush in-
structions, e.g., for interaction with the network device, an attacker
can induce bit flips. Furthermore, if Intel CAT is activated, e.g., as an
anti-DoS mechanism, memory accesses lead to fast cache eviction
and thus frequent DRAM accesses. This enables attacks even if
there are no accesses to uncached memory or flush instructions
while handling the network packet. Thus, the attacker implicitly
hammers the DRAM through the code executed for processing the
network packets. While an attacker cannot control the addresses of
the bit flips, we demonstrate how an attacker can still exploit them.
Nethammer has several building blocks that we systematically de-
veloped. First, we measure whether handling network packets could
at least, in theory, induce bit flips, and the influence of real-world
memory-controller page policies. For this purpose, we present a
new algorithm to observe and classify the memory-controller page
policy. Second, based on these insights, we demonstrate that one-
location hammering [27] does not require a closed-page policy, but
instead, adaptive policies may also allow one-location hammering.
Third, we investigate memory operations that occur while handling
network requests. Fourth, we show that the time windows we ob-
serve between memory accesses from subsequent network requests
enable Rowhammer attacks.
As previous work on Rowhammer showed, once a bit flips in a
system, its security can be subverted. We present different attacks
exploiting bit flips on victim machines to compromise various ser-
vices, in particular, version-control systems, DNS servers and OCSP
servers. In all cases, the triggered bit flips may induce persistent
denial-of-service attacks by corrupting the persistent state, e.g.,
the file system on the remote machine. In our experiments, we
observed bit flips using Nethammer already after 300ms of running
the attack and up to 10 000 bit flips per hour. Nethammer represents
a significant paradigm shift, from local to remote attacks. Previous
fault attacks required physical access or local code execution in
the case of Rowhammer. Making Rowhammer possible over the
network requires re-evaluating the threat model of virtually every
network-connected system.We discuss state-of-the-art countermea-
sures and show that most of them do not affect our attack, including
the target-row-refresh (TRR) countermeasure in hardware. Further-
more, we evaluate the performance of different other proposed
Rowhammer countermeasures against Nethammer. Nethammer is
difficult to detect on systems where high network traffic is com-
monplace. Finally, we discuss how attacks like Nethammer can be
mitigated.
Contributions. The contributions of this work are:
• We present Nethammer, the first truly remote Rowhammer at-
tack, with not even a single line of attacker-controlled code running
on the target device.
• We demonstrate Nethammer on devices that either use uncached
memory or clflush while handling network packets.
• Wedemonstrate that evenwithout uncachedmemory and clflush,
attacks on cloud systems can still be practical.
• We illustrate how our attack invalidates assumptions from previ-
ous works, marking a paradigm shift, and requiring re-evaluation
of the threat models of most network-connected systems.
• We show that many previously proposed defenses, e.g., TRR, do
not work against our new attack.
Outline. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2, we provide background information. In Section 3,
we overview the Nethammer attack. In Section 4, we describe the
building blocks and obtain insights we need for Nethammer. In Sec-
tion 5, we demonstrate how bit flips induced over the network can
be exploited. In Section 6, we evaluate the performance of Netham-
mer in different scenarios on several different systems. In Section 7,
we discuss and propose countermeasures. In Section 8, we discuss
limitations of Nethammer. We conclude our work in Section 9.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the necessary background information
on DRAM, memory controller policies, and the Rowhammer attack.
Furthermore, we discuss caches and cache eviction as well as the
Intel CAT technology.
2.1 DRAM and Memory Controller Policies
DRAMOrganization. Modern computers use DRAM as the main
memory. To maximize data transfer rates, DRAM is organized for
a high degree of parallelism, in a hierarchy of channels, DIMMs,
ranks, bank groups, and banks. Most processors today support dual-
channel or quad-channel configurations. The DIMMs are assigned
to one of the channels. Each DIMM has one or more ranks, e.g., the
two sides of the DIMM may form two ranks. Every rank is further
subdivided into so-called banks, with each bank spanning over
multiple chips. The number of banks in a rank is standardized [45],
e.g., 8 banks on DDR3 and 16 banks on DDR4. Each bank is an array
of cells, organized in rows and columns, storing the actual memory
content. The row size, i.e., the amount of data that can be stored in
all cells of one row, is defined to be 8 kB [45]. Each cell is made out
of a capacitor and an access transistor. The charge of the capacitor
represents the binary data value of the cell. Each cell in the grid is
connected to the neighboring cells with a wire forming horizontal
and vertical bit lines.
When accessing a physical address, the memory controller trans-
lates the physical address to channel, DIMM, rank, bank group,
bank, row, and column addresses. While AMD publicly documents
these addressing functions [3], Intel andARMdo not. Pessl et al. [68]
reverse-engineered these addressing functions using an automated
technique for several Intel and ARM processors.
As DRAM cells lose their charge over time, they must be re-
freshed periodically. The maximum time interval between refreshes
is defined through the row refresh rate, standardized by the JEDEC
group for the different DRAM technologies [45]. Typically, the
refresh interval is 64ms but can vary depending on the device,
on-the-fly adjustments due to the current temperature, or other
external influences. With a 64ms refresh interval, the memory
controller issues the refresh command every 7.8 µs for each bank.
Memory Controller Policies. Each bank has a row buffer, acting
as a directly-mapped cache for the rows. To read data, the data is
moved from the cells of a row to the row buffer before it is sent to
the processor. Similarly, write accesses go to the row buffer instead
of directly to the row. By raising the word line of a row, all access
transistors in that row are activated to connect all capacitors to their
respective bit line. This transfers the charge representing the data
from the row to the row buffer. If the requested data from this bank
is already stored in the row buffer, the data can be transmitted to
the processor immediately, resulting in a fast access time (a row hit).
However, if the requested data is not in the row buffer, a so-called
row conflict occurs, and the bit lines must be pre-charged before the
data can be read from the new target row (row-activate).
Consequently, there are three different cases leading to distinct
access times: row hits are the fastest, an access to a row in a pre-
charged bank is a few nanoseconds slower, row conflicts are sig-
nificantly slower (i.e., several nanoseconds). Hence, the memory
controller can optimize the memory performance by deciding when
to close a row preemptively and pre-charge the bank. Typically,
memory controllers employ one of the three following page policies:
(1) Closed-page policy: the page is immediately closed after ev-
ery read or write request, and the bank is pre-charged and, thus,
ready to open a new row (page-empty). If subsequent accesses are
likely to be from other rows, a closed-page policy can achieve a
better average system performance.
(2) Fixed open-page policy: the page is left open for a fixed
amount of time after a read or write request. If temporal local-
ity is given, subsequent accesses are served with a low latency. This
policy is also beneficial for power consumption and bank utiliza-
tion [48].
(3) Adaptive open-page policy: the adaptive open-page policy
by Intel [21] is similar to the fixed open-page policy but dynam-
ically adjusts the page timeout interval. Each row buffer has a
timeout counter and a timeout register. A row remains open until
the timeout counter reaches the value of the timeout register. As
the initial timeout register value might not be the most efficient,
an additional mistake counter is introduced to update the timeout
register dynamically [26]. If a row conflict occurs, the memory
controller kept the row open for too long and hence, the mistake
counter is decremented. Whenever a page-empty access could have
been a hit as the requested row is the same as the last accessed one,
the mistake counter is incremented. Periodically, the value of the
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Figure 1: Different hammering strategies: blue rectangles ( )
represent the hammered location, while red rectangles ( )
represent the most likely location for bit flips to occur.
mistake counter is checked to decide if a less or more aggressive
close-page policy should be used. If the mistake counter is higher
than a certain threshold, the timeout register is incremented to
keep the row open for a longer period of time, and conversely, if
the mistake counter is lower than a certain threshold, the timeout
register is decremented to close the row earlier.
As modern processors have many cores running independently
as well as deploy large caches and complex algorithms for spatial
and temporal prefetching, the probability that subsequent memory
accesses go to the same row decreases. Awasthi et al. [8] proposed
an access-based page policy that assumes a row receives the same
number of accesses as the last time it was activated. Shen et al. [79]
proposed a policy taking past memory accesses into account to
decide whether to close a row preemptively. Intel suggested pre-
dicting how long a row should be kept open [47, 82]. Consequently,
more complex memory controller policies have been proposed and
are implemented in modern processors [26, 48]. Besides these mem-
ory controller policies, the memory controller can also reorder and
combine memory accesses [76].
2.2 Rowhammer
With increasing DRAM cell density, the physical size of DRAM
cells and their capacitance decreases. While this has the advantage
of higher storage capacity and lower power consumption, cells
may be more susceptible to disturbance errors. Disturbance errors
are interferences between cells that cause memory corruption by
unintentionally flipping the bit-value of a DRAM cell [62].
In 2014, Kim et al. [50] demonstrated that such bit flips could be
reliably triggered in a DRAM row by accessing memory locations
in adjacent DRAM rows in a high frequency, a technique known as
row hammering [35]. Typically, subsequent memory accesses would
be served from the CPU cache. However, in a Rowhammer attack,
the cache is bypassed by either using specific instructions [50],
cache eviction [4, 9, 25, 28] or uncached memory [69, 84].
To reliably induce bit flips, different techniques have been pro-
posed using different memory access patterns as illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. While the name single-sided hammering suggests that only
one memory location is accessed, Seaborn and Dullien [78] accessed
8 randomly chosen memory locations simultaneously. Seaborn and
Dullien [78] focused on a typical DDR3 setup with 32 DRAM banks.
Following the birthday paradox, the probability is quite high that
at least 2 out of 8 random memory locations map into the same
DRAM bank. By repeatedly accessing these 8 memory locations,
the attacker induces row conflicts at a high frequency. With single-
sided hammering, bit flips most likely occur in some proximity to
one of the 8 hammered rows.
With double-sided hammering, the attacker chooses three rows,
where the two outer rows are hammered. Bit flips most likely occur
in the row between the two rows. Double-sided hammering requires
at least partial knowledge of virtual-to-physical mappings.
Finally, Gruss et al. [27] proposed one-location hammering, in
which the attacker only accesses one single location at a high fre-
quency. The attacker does not directly induce row conflicts but
instead keeps re-opening one row permanently. As modern pro-
cessors do not use strict open-page policies anymore, the memory
controller preemptively closes rows earlier than necessary, causing
row conflicts on the subsequent accesses of the attacker. Bit flips
most likely occur in proximity to the hammered row.
Using these techniques, the Rowhammer bug has been exploited
in different scenarios. Bhattacharya and Mukhopadhyay [11] ex-
ploited untargeted bit flips at random locations to produce faulty
RSA signatures, allowing the recovery of the secret keys. How-
ever, as bit flips can be reproduced quite reliably, more determin-
istic attacks have been mounted. These attacks include privilege-
escalation attacks, sandbox escapes and the compromise of cryp-
tographic algorithms. They have been mounted from sandboxed
environments [78], from native environments [27, 78], from vir-
tual machines in the cloud [73, 86], as well as from within a web
browser running JavaScript [14, 28]. Furthermore, attacks from na-
tive code [84] and JavaScript within the browser sandbox [25] have
been demonstrated on mobile devices. To reliably induce a bit flip
on a specific page, memory spraying [28, 78, 86], grooming [84],
and page deduplication [14, 73] have been used.
To develop countermeasures, a large body of research focused on
detecting [17, 18, 29, 31, 43, 67, 91], neutralizing [14, 15, 28, 73, 84],
or eliminating [9, 15, 18, 26, 49, 50] Rowhammer attacks in software
or hardware. Furthermore, the LPDDR4 standard [46] specifies
two features to mitigate Rowhammer attacks: with Target Row
Refresh (TRR) the memory controller refreshes adjacent rows of
a certain row and with Maximum Activation Count (MAC) the
number of times a row can be activated before adjacent rows have to
be refreshed is specified. However, in 2018, Gruss et al. [27] showed
that an attacker can bypass all software-based countermeasures
and gain root privileges by mounting a one-location hammering
Rowhammer attack from inside an Intel SGX enclave.
2.3 Caches and Cache Eviction
Caching is a fundamental concept that is used to reduce the latency
of various operations, in particular computations and accesses to
slower storage. Hardware caches keep frequently used data from
main memory in smaller but faster memories.
CacheOrganization. ModernCPUs havemultiple levels of caches,
varying in size and latency, where the level-1 (L1) cache is the
smallest and fastest, and the L3 or last-level cache is the biggest but
slowest cache. Modern caches are organized in cache sets consisting
of a fixed number of cache ways. The cache set is determined by ei-
ther the virtual or physical address. Addresses are called congruent
if they map to the same cache set. The cache replacement policy
Last-Level Cache
VM1 VM2 VM3
(a) CAT disabled
Last-Level Cache
VM1 VM2 VM3
(b) CAT enabled
Figure 2: When Intel CAT is disabled in (a), the cache is
shared among the virtual machines. In (b), Intel CAT is con-
figured with 6 ways for VM1, and 1 way for VM2 and VM3.
decides which of the cache ways is replaced (evicted) when new
data has to be loaded into the cache.
On most Intel CPUs, the last-level cache is inclusive, i.e., data
present in L1 or L2 cache must also be present in the last-level
cache. Furthermore, the last-level cache is shared among all cores
and divided into so-called cache slices. The hash function that maps
physical addresses to slices is not publicly documented but has been
reverse-engineered [39, 57, 88].
Cache Eviction. To mount a Rowhammer attack, memory ac-
cesses need to be directly served by the main memory. Thus, an
attacker needs to make sure that the data is not stored in the cache.
An attacker can use the unprivileged clflush instruction [87] to
invalidate the cache line or use uncached memory if available [84].
On devices where no uncached memory and no unprivileged cache
flush instruction is available, an attacker can instead evict a cache
line by accessing congruent memory addresses [25, 28, 52], i.e., ad-
dresses that map to the same cache set and same cache slice. Merely
accessing a large number of different but congruent addresses in an
arbitrary order typically does not lead to a high eviction rate. Gruss
et al. [28] observed that to evict the victim address, a so-called evic-
tion set of attacker-chosen congruent addresses has to be accessed
in a specific pattern. The eviction set does not contain the victim
address, which is consequently evicted from the cache.
Intel CAT. In 2016, Intel introduced Cache Allocation Technol-
ogy (CAT) [41] to address quality of service in multi-core server
platforms [32, 40]. Intel CAT allows system software to partition
the last-level cache to optimize workloads in shared environments
as well as to isolate applications or virtual machines in the cloud.
When a virtual machine in the cloud thrashes the cache and there-
fore decreases the performance of other co-located machines, the
hypervisor can restrict this virtual machine to a subset of the cache
to retain the performance of other tenants. More specifically, Intel
CAT allows restricting the number of cache ways available to pro-
cesses, virtual machines, and containers, as illustrated in Figure 2.
However, Aga et al. [4] showed that Intel CAT allows improving
eviction-based Rowhammer attacks as it reduces the number of
accesses required for cache eviction and consequently reduces the
time required to evict an address from the cache.
3 NETHAMMER ATTACK
All previously published Rowhammer attacks rely on some form
of code execution on the targeted device, be it the execution of a
native binary [4, 27, 73, 78], an application [84] or using a scripted
language in the web browser, like JavaScript [14, 25, 28]. In this sec-
tion, we present Nethammer, the first Rowhammer attack that does
not rely on any attacker-controlled code on the victim machine.
3.1 Attack Overview
Nethammer sends a crafted stream of network packets to the tar-
get device to mount a one-location or single-sided Rowhammer
attack by exploiting quality-of-service technologies deployed on
the device. For each packet received on the target device, a set of
addresses is accessed, either in the kernel driver or a user-space
application processing the contents. By repeatedly sending pack-
ets, this set of addresses is hammered and, thus, bit flips may be
induced. As frequently-used addresses are served from the cache
for performance, the cache must be bypassed such that the access
goes directly into the DRAM to cause the row conflicts required for
hammering. This can be achieved in different ways if the code that
is executed (in kernel space or user space) when receiving a packet,
(1) flushes (and later on reloads) an address;
(2) uses uncached memory;
(3) evicts (and later on reloads) an address.
All three scenarios are plausible. Uncached memory is often used on
ARM-based devices for interaction with the hardware, e.g., access
buffers used by the network controller. Intel x86 processors have
the clflush instruction for the same purpose. We verified that an
attack is practical in both scenarios, as we describe in Section 6.2.
As caches are large, and cache replacement policies try to keep
frequently-used data in the cache, it is not trivial to mount an
eviction-based attack without executing attacker-controlled code
on the device. However, to address quality of service in multi-core
server platforms, Intel introduced CAT (cf. Section 2.3), allowing
to control the amount of cache available to applications or virtual
machines dynamically as illustrated in Figure 2. If a virtual ma-
chine is thrashing the cache, the hypervisor limits the number of
cache ways available to this virtual machine to meet performance
guarantees given to other tenants on the same physical machine.
Thus, if an attacker excessively uses the cache, its virtual machine
is restricted to a low number of ways, possibly only one, leading to
a fast self-eviction of addresses.
3.2 Attack Setup
In our attack setup, the attacker has a fast network connection
to the victim machine, e.g., a gigabit connection. We assume that
the victim machine has DDR2, DDR3, or DDR4 memory that is
susceptible to one-location (or single-sided) hammering.
Personal Computers. For our attack on personal computers,
tablets, smartphones, or devices with similar hardware configu-
ration, we make no further assumptions.
Cloud Systems. For our attack on cloud systems, we assume that
the victim is running a virtual machine on a cloud server providing
an interface or API accessible over the network. Furthermore, to
prevent denial-of-service situations due to cache thrashing, we
assume that the hypervisor on the cloud server uses Intel CAT to
constrain the virtual machine of the victim to a subset of the cache.
Note that there are overlaps between the two attack setups. A
personal computer can be susceptible to the attack we describe
for the cloud scenario. Even more likely a cloud system can be
susceptible to the attack we describe for personal computers.
3.3 Inducing Bit Flips over Network
To induce bit flips remotely, one requirement is to send as many
packets as possible over the network in a short time frame. As
defined in Section 3.2, we assume that either uncached memory or
clflush is used when receiving a network packet or alternatively,
that Intel CAT is active on the victim machine. Thus, every single
packet processed by the network stack actively evicts and reloads
data from the cache. By sending many packets, the corresponding
addresses are hammered efficiently.
As an example, UDP packets without content can be used, allow-
ing an overall packet size of 64 B, which is the minimum packet size
for an Ethernet packet. This allows to send up to 1 024 000 packets
per second over a 500Mbit/s connection.
4 FROM REGULAR MEMORY ACCESSES TO
ROWHAMMER
Naturally, several challenges need to be solved to induce Rowham-
mer bit flips over the network. Fundamentally, we need to investi-
gate memory-controller page policies to determine whether regular
memory accesses that occur while handling network packets could
at least, in theory, induce bit flips. Note that these investigations
are oblivious to the specific technique to access the DRAM row (i.e.,
eviction, flushing, uncached memory). Hence, in this section, we
do not discuss clflush, uncached memory, or eviction strategies
with [4] or without Intel CAT [28, 52]. We defer comparisons of
Nethammer with these techniques to Section 6. In this section, we
focus on the underlying behavior of the memory controller and
what this means for possible attacks.
Gruss et al. [27] found that the memory-controller page policy
has a significant influence on the way the Rowhammer bug can be
triggered. In particular, they found that one-location hammering
works and deduced from this that the memory-controller page
policy must be similar to a closed-page policy. Most previous work
on Rowhammer assumed an open-row policy [4, 9, 11, 50, 62, 69,
73, 78, 84, 86]. In Section 4.1, we propose a method to determine the
memory-controller page policy on real-world systems automatically.
We show that one-location hammering does not necessarily need a
closed-page policy, but instead, adaptive policies may allow one-
location hammering.
Based on these insights, we demonstrate the first one-location
Rowhammer attack on an ARM device in Section 4.2, and draw the
connection to the attack presented by Aga et al. [4]. Finally, we in-
vestigate whether Rowhammer via network packets is theoretically
possible. Network packets do not arrive with the same speed as the
memory accesses in an optimized tight loop.
4.1 Automated Classification of
Memory-Controller Page Policies
Gruss et al. [27] stated that a requirement for one-location ham-
mering is a policy similar to a closed-page policy. To get a more
in-depth understanding of the memory-controller page policy used
on a specific system, we present an automated method to detect
the used policy. This is a significant step forward for Rowhammer
attacks, as it allows to deduce whether specific attack variants may
or may not work without an empiric evaluation. Pessl et al. [68]
reverse-engineered the undocumented mapping functions of physi-
cal memory addresses to DRAM channels, ranks and banks. These
mapping functions allow selecting addresses located in the same
bank but in a different row. If we access these addresses consec-
utively, we will cause a row conflict in the corresponding bank.
This row conflict induces latency for the second access because the
currently active row must be closed (written back), the bank must
be pre-charged, and only then the new row can be fetched with an
activate command. This side-channel information can not only be
used to build a covert communication channel [68], but as we show,
it can also be used to detect the page policy used by the memory
controller.
AutomatedClassification of thePage-policy. Weassume knowl-
edge of processor and DRAM timings. For the DRAM this means in
particular, the tRCD latency (the time to select a column address),
and the tRP latency (the time between pre-charge and row activa-
tion). These three timings influence the observed latency as follows:
(1) we consider the case page open / row hit as the base line;
(2) in the case page empty / bank pre-charged, we observe an
additional latency of tRP over a row hit;
(3) in the case pagemiss / row conflict, we observe an additional
latency of (tRP + tRCD) over a row hit.
To compute the actual number of cycles we can expect, we have
to divide the DRAM latency value by the DRAM clock rate. In
case of DDR4, we have to additionally divide the latency value by
factor two, as DDR4 is double-clocked. This yields the latency in
nanoseconds. By dividing the nanoseconds by the processor clock
speed, we obtain the latency in CPU cycles. Still, as we cannot ob-
tain absolutely clean measurements due to out-of-order execution,
prefetching, and other mechanisms that aim to hide the DRAM
latency, the actually observed latency will deviate slightly.
As in our test we cannot simply measure the three different cases,
we define an experiment that allows to distinguish the different
policies. In the experiment we use for our automated classification,
we select two addresses A and B that map to the same bank but
different rows. Using the clflush instruction, we make sure that
A and B are not cached, in order to load those addresses directly
from main memory. We base our method on two observations for
open-page policies:
Single By loading address A an increasing number of times (n =
1..10 000) before measuring the time it takes to load the same ad-
dress on a subsequent access, we can measure the access time of an
address in DRAM if the corresponding row is already active. For
an open-page policy the access time should be the same for any n.
Conflict By accessing address A and subsequently measuring the
access time to address B, we can measure the access time of an
address in DRAM in the occurrence of a row conflict.
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Figure 3: Measured access times over a period of time for
a single address (blue) and an address causing a row con-
flict (red) for different page policies on the Intel Xeon D-
1541: open policy (left), closed policy (middle), adaptive pol-
icy (right).
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Figure 4: Open-page policy and adaptive page policy can be
distinguished by testing increasing numbers of accesses to
the same row. The open-page policy (Intel Core i7-4790) al-
ways has the same timing for subsequent accesses, since the
row always remains open. The adaptive page policy (Intel
Xeon E5-1630v4) only leaves the row open for a longer time
after a larger number of accesses.
Our classification now works by running the following checks:
(1) If there is no timing difference between the two cases described
above (Singlewith a largen andConflict), the system uses a closed-
page policy. The closed-page policy immediately closes the row
after every read or write request. Thus, there is no timing difference
between these two cases. The timing observed corresponds to the
row-pre-charged state.
(2) Otherwise, if the timing for the Single case is the same, re-
gardless of the value of n, but differs from the timing for Conflict,
the system uses an open-page policy. The timing difference corre-
sponds to the row hits and row conflicts. Following the definition
of the open-page policy, the timing for row hits is always the same.
(3) Otherwise, the timing for the Single case will have a jump at
some n after which the page policy is adapted to cope better with
our workload. Consequently, the timing differences we observe
correspond to row hit and row-pre-charged states.
Figure 3 shows the memory access time measured on an In-
tel Xeon D-1541 with different page policies. The plot shows that
closed-page policy can be distinguished from the other two us-
ing our method. We also verified our results by reading out the
CLOSE_PG bit in the mcmtr configuration register of the integrated
memory controller [42].
We validated that we can distinguish open-page policy and adap-
tive page policy by running our experiments on two systems with
the corresponding page policies. Figure 4 shows the results of these
experiments. The difference between open-page policy and adaptive
policy is clearly visible.
Our experiments show that adaptive page policies often be-
have like closed-page policies. This indicates the possibility of
one-locating hammering on systems using an adaptive page policy.
4.2 One-location Hammering on ARM
To make Nethammer a more generic attack, it is essential to demon-
strate it not only on Intel CPUs but also on ARM CPUs. This is
particularly interesting as ARM CPUs dominate the mobile market,
and ARM-based devices are predominant also in IoT applications.
Gruss et al. [27] only demonstrated one-location hammering on
Intel CPUs. However, as one-location hammering is the most plau-
sible hammering variant for Nethammer, we need to investigate
whether it is possible to trigger one-location hammering bit flips
on ARM.
In our experiments, we used a LG Nexus 4 E960 mobile phone
equipped with a Qualcomm Snapdragon 600 (APQ8064) [71] SoC
and 2GB of LPDDR2 RAM, susceptible to bit flips using double-
sided hammering. The page policy used by the memory controller
is selected via the DDR_CMD_EXEC_OPT_0 register: if the bit is set
to 1, which is the recommended value [72], a closed-page policy
is used. If the bit is set to 0, an open-page policy is used. Hence,
we can expect the memory controller to preemptively close rows,
enabling one-location hammering.
So far, bit flips on ARM-based devices have only been demon-
strated in the combination of double-sided hammering, and un-
cached memory [84] or access via the GPU [25]. Even in the pres-
ence of a flush instruction [7] or optimal cache eviction strate-
gies [52], the access frequency to the two neighboring rows is too
low to induce bit flips. Furthermore, devices with the ARMv8 in-
struction set that allows exposing a flush instruction to unprivileged
programs are usually equipped with LPDDR4 memory.
In our experiment, we allocated uncached memory using the
Android IONmemory allocator [90].We hammered a single random
address within the uncached memory region at a high frequency
and then checked the memory for occurred bit flips. We were able
to observe 4 bit flips while hammering for 10 hours. Thus, we can
conclude that there are ARM-based devices that are vulnerable to
one-location hammering.
4.3 Minimal Access Frequency for
Rowhammer Attacks
A show stopper for Nethammer is if the frequency of memory ac-
cesses caused by processing network packets is not high enough
to induce bit flips on one of our test systems successfully. As the
system performs many memory accesses when handling a network
packet, the attacker, in fact, cannot tell whether only one location
in a bank is hammered (i.e., one-location hammering) or multiple
locations (i.e., single-sided hammering). In particular, following
the pigeon-hole principle, in our test setups with 32 bank (single
DIMM) or 64 bank (dual DIMM) setups, we know that, if we ac-
cess at least n + 1 different addresses, i.e., 33 or 65 respectively, at
least two addresses must be served from the same bank. Hence,
we can assume that there is a good probability that the attacker
actually does single-sided hammering. Moreover, some addresses
are accessed multiple times.
Previous work has investigated the minimal number of accesses
that are necessary within a 64ms refresh interval to still obtain
bit flips. Kim et al. [50] reported bit flips starting at 139 000 row
activations per refresh interval, which can be, depending on the
page policy, identical to the number of memory accesses. Gruss
et al. [28] reported bit flips starting at 43 000 and Aweke et al. [9]
at 110 000 memory accesses per refresh interval.
In our experiments, we send 500Mbit/s (and more) over the net-
work interface. With a minimum size of 64 B for Ethernet packets,
we can send 1 024 000 packets per second over a 500Mbit/s con-
nection. As described in Section 6.2, we found functions which
are called multiple times, e.g., 6 times in the case of once func-
tion. Hence, on a 500Mbit/s connection, the attack can induce
6 144 000 accesses per second. Divided by the default refresh inter-
val of 64ms, we are at 393 216 accesses per refresh interval. This is
clearly above the previously reported required number of memory
accesses [9, 28, 50]. Hence, we conclude that in theory, if the system
is susceptible to Rowhammer attacks, network packets can induce
bit flips. In the following section, we will describe how an attacker
can exploit such bit flips.
5 EXPLOITING BIT FLIPS OVER A NETWORK
In this section, we discuss Nethammer attack scenarios to exploit
bit flips over the network in detail. We discuss the possible locations
of bit flips in Section 5.1. We describe different Nethammer attacks
in Section 5.2.
5.1 Bit Flip Location and Effect
As the Nethammer attack does not control where in physical mem-
ory a bit flip is induced and, thus, what is stored at that location,
the bit flip can lead to different consequences. On a high level, we
can divide bit flips into two groups, based on the location of the
flip. We distinguish between bit flips in user memory, i.e., memory
pages that are mapped as user_accessible in at least one process,
and bit flips in kernel memory, i.e., memory pages that are never
mapped as user_accessible. We can also distinguish the bit flips
based on their high-level effect, again forming two groups. The first
group consists of bit flips that lead to a denial-of-service situation.
The second group consists of bit flips that do not lead to a denial-
of-service situation. If a denial-of-service situation is temporary, a
system reboot may be necessary. A denial-of-service situation can
be persistent if the bit flip is written back to a permanent storage
location. Then it may be necessary to reinstall the system software
or parts of it from scratch, clearly taking more time than just a
reboot. Denial-of-service attacks have a direct financial impact on
companies due to unplanned downtimes and maintenance times.
Moreover, studies show that their announcement can also have a
negative impact on the stock prices [1]. Consequently, Nethammer
poses a severe threat to servers vulnerable to the attack.
5.2 Bit Flip Targets
Nethammer may induce a bit flip in kernel memory. Depending on
the modified location, parts of the operating system can behave
unexpectedly, or the entire system may even halt. Bit flips in user
memory may have similar consequences.
5.2.1 File System Data Structures. File system data structures,
e.g., inodes, are not directly part of the kernel code or data but are
also in the kernel memory. An inode is a data structure defining a
file or a directory of a file system. Each inode contains metadata
such as the size of the file, owner and permission data as well as the
disk block location of its data. If a bit flips in the inode structure,
it corrupts the file system and, thus, causes persistent loss of data.
This may again crash the entire system.
5.2.2 SGX Enclave Page Cache. If the victim machine supports
Intel SGX [19], an x86 instruction-set extension that allows the
execution of programs in so-called secure enclaves to run with in-
tegrity and confidentiality guarantees in untrusted environments,
a bit flip easily causes a denial of service. Enclave memory is stored
in a physically contiguous block of memory that is encrypted us-
ing a Memory Encryption Engine [30]. Jang et al. [44] and Gruss
et al. [27] demonstrated that if a bit flip in enclave memory is in-
duced, the Memory Encryption Engine locks the memory controller,
preventing any future memory operations and thus, halting the
entire system.While such a bit flip is not persistent itself, the unsafe
halting of the entire system can leave permanent damage leading
to a persistent denial-of-service.
5.2.3 Application Memory in General. If a bit flip occurs in mem-
ory of a user-space application, e.g., code or data, a possible outcome
is the crash of the program. Such a flip may render the affected
service unavailable.
Another outcome of a bit flip in the data of a user-space applica-
tion, e.g., in the database of a service, is that the service delivers
modified, possibly invalid, content. Depending on the service, its
users cannot distinguish if the data is correct or has been altered.
Altering DNS Entries to redirect to Malicious Services. To re-
solve domain names to the corresponding IP address, a DNS re-
quest [60] is sent to a DNS server. DNS servers are organized in
a tree-like structure, building a distributed system to store DNS
records. A record consists of a type, a name, a class code, a time-
to-live for caching, and the value. For instance, the A record holds
a 32-bit IPv4 address for a specific domain. However, DNS allows
defining aliases to map one domain name to another. This is used to
define message transfer agents for a domain or to redirect domains.
In this attack, the attacker leverages Nethammer to induce a bit
flip in a character of a DNS entry to make it point to a different
domain. For instance, domain.com changes to dnmain.com if the
least-significant bit of the “o” character is flipped from ‘1’ to ‘0’. Such
an attack is also referred to as bitsquatting [20]. Such bit flips in
domains have been successfully exploited before using Rowhammer
attacks [73]. DNS zone transfers (AXFR queries) allow replicating
DNS databases across different servers. Using zone transfers, an
attacker can retrieve entries of an entire zone at once. The attacker
queries the DNS server for its entries, mounts the attack and then
verifies whether a bit flip at an exploitable position has occurred
by monitoring changes in the queried entries. If so, the attacker
can register the changed domain and host a malicious service on
the domain, e.g., a fake website to steal login credentials or a mail
server intercepting email traffic. Users querying the DNS server
for said entry connect to the server controlled by the attacker and
are thus exposed to data theft. A flip might also change an MX
entry, pointing it to a different domain. The attacker can then again
register the domain and intercept connections that were intended
to go to the original mail server.
Rebuilding Trust in Revoked Certificates.An attacker can also
target OCSP servers. The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
is a protocol to retrieve the revocation status of a certificate [77]. In
contrast to a certificate revocation list, where all revoked certificates
are enumerated, the OCSP protocol enables to query the status of a
single certificate. This protocol shifts the workload from the user
to the OCSP server, so that users, or more specifically browsers, do
not have to store huge revocation lists. Instead, the OCSP server
manages a list of revoked certificate fingerprints.
Digital certificates are used to generate digital signatures that
present the authenticity of digital documents or messages. They are
typically obtained from a trusted party, e.g., a certificate authority.
The certificate allows verifying that a specific signature was indeed
issued by the signer. However, if the corresponding private key
of a certificate is exposed to the public, everyone can sign data in
the name of the signer. Hence, a user can revoke a certificate to
avoid any abuse. Liu et al. [53] evaluated 74 full IPv4 HTTPS scans
and found that 8% of 38 514 130 unique SSL certificates served have
been revoked.
To process a certificate validity request, the server queries its
database for the requested certificate identifier. The result can either
be that the certificate is revoked, not revoked (i.e., valid), or that
the state is unknown (i.e., it is not in the database). If a client tries
to establish a secure connection to a server or check the validity
of a signed document, it queries the OCSP server provided by the
certificate. If the certificate has been revoked, the client aborts the
connection or marks the signature as invalid.
In this attack, the attacker flips a bit in the memory of an OCSP
server of a certificate authority where private keys of certificates
have become public, and the certificates have thus been revoked.
The attacker can either flip the status or the identifier of the certifi-
cate. As the status of the certificate is stored as an ASCII character
in the OpenSSL OCSP responder [65], one bit flip is sufficient to flip
the “R” (revoked) to “V” (valid). Assuming the memory is filled with
revocation list entries, which are on average 100 B for this specific
responder, an attacker has a chance of 0.125 % per bit flip to make
a random certificate valid again. Thus, an attacker can again reuse
that certificate (with the known private key) to sign documents or
data and, thus, impersonate the original signer.
A weaker, but more likely attack scenario, is to flip a bit in
the certificate identifier. Such a bit flip leads to the OCSP server
not finding the certificate in its database anymore, thus, return-
ing “unknown” as the state. Most browsers fall back to their own
certificate revocation list in such a case [2, 56, 66]. However, only
high-value revocations are kept in the browser’s list, making it very
unlikely that the certificate is in the certificate revocation list of
the browser [2]. Hence, an attacker can again reuse that certificate.
Other attacks. The attack scenarios described above are by far not
exhaustive. With bit flips in applications, attackers have numerous
possibilities to modify random data, yielding different, disastrous
consequences. However, the outlined attacks highlight the severity
of remotely induced bit flips by Nethammer.
5.2.4 Cryptographic Material. Cryptographic material as part
of the application memory is particularly interesting for attacks.
In the past, it has been demonstrated that fault attacks on RSA
public keys result in broken keys which are susceptible to key
factorization [10, 16]. Therefore, also public key material has to be
protected against faults. Muir [61] remarked that a bit flip in an
RSA public key allows an attacker with a non-negligible probability
to compute a private key corresponding to the modified key in a
reasonable amount of time. Thus, an attacker can flip a bit of a
public RSA key in memory using Nethammer, giving the attacker
the same privileges and permissions as the owner of the original
key. These permissions are only temporary, e.g., until the key is
reloaded from the hard drive.
Distribution ofMalicious Software onVersion-ControlHost-
ing Services. An attacker can compromise a hosting service to
distribute malicious software. The number of organizations using
hosting services for revision control to manage changes to their
source code, documents or other information is increasing steadily.
These services can either be subscription based, e.g., GitHub [36],
or self-hosted, e.g., GitLab [37], and, thus, are deployed on many
web servers to distribute their software.
To commit changes to a version-controlled repository, users
authenticate with the service using public-key cryptography. Typ-
ically, users generate an SSH key pair [89], e.g., using RSA [75],
upload the public key to the service, and store the private key se-
curely on their local system. As the position of the bit flip cannot
be controlled using Nethammer, an attacker can improve the prob-
ability to induce a bit flip in the modulus of a public key by loading
as many keys as possible into the main memory of the server. Some
APIs, e.g., the GitLab API [38], allow enumerating the users regis-
tered for the service as well as their public keys. By enumerating
and, therefore, accessing all public keys of the service, the attacker
loads the public keys into the DRAM.
In the first step of the attack, the attacker enumerates all keys of
all users and stores them locally. In the second step, the attacker
mounts Nethammer to induce bit flips on the targeted system. The
more keys the attacker loaded into memory, the more likely it is
that the bit flip corrupts the modulus of a public key of a user. For
instance, with 80 % of the memory filled with 4096-bit keys, the
chance to hit a bit of a modulus is 79.7 %. As the attacker does not
knowwhich keywas affected by the bit flip, the attacker enumerates
all keys again and compares them with the locally stored keys.
If a modified key has been found, the attacker computes a new
corresponding private key [61, 73]. The attacker uses this new key to
authenticatewith the service, impersonating the user. Consequently,
the attacker can make changes to the software repository as that
user and, thus, introduce bugs that can later be exploited if the
software is distributed. The original public key will be restored
after a while when the key is evicted from the page cache and has
to be reloaded from the hard drive. As the correct key is restored,
the attack leaves no traces. Furthermore, it also breaks the non-
repudiation guarantee provided by the public-key authentication,
making the victim whose public key was attacked the prime suspect
in possible investigations.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate Nethammer and its performance. We
show that the number of bit flips induced byNethammer depends on
how the cache is bypassed and the memory-controller’s page policy.
We evaluate which kernel functions are executed when handling a
UDP network packet. We describe the bit flips we obtained when
running Nethammer in different attack scenarios. Finally, we show
that TRR does not protect against Nethammer or Rowhammer in
general.
6.1 Environment
In our evaluation, we used the test systems listed in Table 1. We
used the first system for our experiments with a non-default net-
work driver implementation that uses clflush in the process of
handling a network packet, and the second and third system for
our experiments with Intel CAT. To mount Nethammer, we used
a Gigabit switch to connect two other machines with the victim
machine. The two other machines were used to flood the victim
machine with network packets triggering the Rowhammer bug.
We used the fourth system for our experiments on an ARM-based
device that uses uncached memory in the process of handling a
network packet.
6.2 Evaluation of the Different Cache Bypasses
for Nethammer
In Section 4, we investigated the requirements to trigger the Rowham-
mer bug over the network. In this section, we evaluate Nethammer
for the three cache-bypass techniques (see Section 3.1): a kernel
driver that flushes (and reloads) an address whenever a packet is
received, Intel Xeon CPUs with Intel CAT for fast cache eviction,
and uncached memory on an ARM-based mobile device.
Driver with clflush. To verify that Nethammer can induce bit
flips, we used a non-default network driver implementation that
uses clflush in the process of handling a network packet on an
Intel i7-6700K CPU.We sent UDP packets with up to 500Mbit/s and
scanned memory regions where we expected bit flips. We observed
a bit flip every 350ms showing that hammering over the network
is feasible if at least two memory accesses are served from main
memory, due to flushing an address while handling a network
packet. Thus, in this scenario, up to 10 000 bit flips per hour can be
induced.
Eviction with Intel CAT. The operating system will handle ev-
ery network packet received by the network card. The operating
system parses the packets depending on their type, validates their
checksum and copies and delivers every packet to each registered
socket queue. Thus, for each received packet quite some code is ex-
ecuted before the packet finally arrives at the application destined
to handle its content.
We tested Nethammer on Intel Xeon CPUs with Intel CAT. The
number of cache ways has been limited to a single one for code
handling the processing of UDP packets, resulting in fast cache
eviction. If a function is called multiple times for one packet, the
same addresses are accessed and loaded from DRAM with a high
probability, thus, hammering this location. To estimate how many
different functions are called and how often they are called, we
Table 1: List of test systems that were used for the experiments.
Device CPU DRAM Network card Operating system
Desktop Intel i7-6700K @ 4GHz 8GB DDR4 @ 2133MHz Intel 10G X550T Ubuntu 16.04
Server Intel Xeon E5-1630v4 @ 3.7GHz 8GB DDR4 @ 2133MHz Intel i210/i218-LM Gigabit Xubuntu 17.10
Server Intel Xeon D-1541 @ 2.1GHz 8GB DDR4 @ 2133MHz Intel i350-AM2 Gigabit Ubuntu 16.04
LG Nexus 4 Qualcomm APQ8064 @ 1.5GHz 2GB LPDDR2 @ 533MHz USB Adapter Android 5.1.1
use the perf framework [22] to count the number of function calls
related to UDP packet handling. Appendix A shows the results of
a system handling UDP packets. Out of 27 different functions we
identified, most were called only once for each received packet. The
function __udp4_lib_lookup is called twice. In a more extensive
profiling scan, we found that nf_hook_slow is called 6 times while
handling UDP packets on some kernels.
With this knowledge, we analyzed how many bit flips can be
induced from this code execution. We observed 45 bit flips per
hour on the Intel Xeon E5-1630v4. As TRR is active on this system
(see Section 6.5), fewer bit flips occur in comparison to systems
without TRR. In Section 6.3, we evaluate the number of bit flips on
the Intel Xeon D-1541 depending on the configured page policy.
Uncached Memory. In Section 4.2, we demonstrated that ARM-
based devices are vulnerable to one-location hammering in general.
To investigate whether bit flips can also be induced over the net-
work, we connect the LG Nexus 4 using an OTG USB ethernet
adapter to a local network. Using a different machine, we send as
many network packets as possible to the mobile phone. An appli-
cation on the phone allocates memory and repeatedly checks the
allocated memory for occurred bit flips. However, we were not able
to observe any bit flips on the device within 12 hours of hammering.
As the device does not deploy a technology like Intel CAT (Sec-
tion 2.3), the cache is not limited for certain applications and, thus,
the eviction of code or data used by handling memory packets has
a low probability. As network drivers often use DMA memory and,
thus, uncached memory, bit flips induced by the network are more
likely if the network driver itself uses uncached memory. While we
identified a remarkable number of around 5500 uncacheable pages
used by the system, we were not able to induce any bit flips over
the network. However, we found that the USB ethernet adapter
only allowed for a network capacity of less than 16Mbit/s, which
is clearly too slow for a Nethammer attack. It is very likely that
with a faster network connection, e.g., more than 200Mbit/s, it is
possible to induce bit flips. Nevertheless, we were successfully able
to induce bit flips using Nethammer on the Intel Xeon E5-1630v4
where one uncached address is accessed for every received UDP
packet.
6.3 Influence of Memory-Controller Page
Policies on Rowhammer
In order to evaluate the actual influence of the used memory-
controller page policy on Nethammer, i.e., howmany bit flips can be
induced depending on the policy used, we mounted the Nethammer
in different settings. The experiment was conducted on our Intel
Xeon D-1541 test system, as the BIOS of its motherboard allowed to
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Figure 5: Number of bit flips depending on the CPU load
with a closed-page policy after 15 minutes (Xeon D-1541).
chose between different page policies: Auto, Closed, Open, Adaptive.
For each run, we configured the victim machine with one of the
policies and Intel CAT, and, mounted a Nethammer attack for at
least 4 hours. To detect bit flips, we ran a program on the victim
machine that mapped a file into memory. The program then repeat-
edly scans the content of all allocated pages and reports bit flips if
the content has changed.
We detected 11 bit flips in 4 hours with the Closed policy, with
the first one after 90 minutes. We did not observe any bit flips with
the Open policy within the first 4 hours. However, when running
the experiment longer, we observed 46 bit flips within 10 hours.
With the Adaptive policy, we observed 10 bit flips in 4 hours, with
the first one within the second hour of the experiment. While this
experiment was conducted without any additional load on the sys-
tem, we see in Figure 5 that additional CPU utilization increases the
number of bitflips drastically. Using the Closed policy, we observed
27 bitflips with a load of 35% within 15 minutes.
These results do not immediately align with the assumption that
a policy that preemptively closes rows is required to induce bit
flips using one-location hammering. However, depending on the
addresses that are accessed and the constant eviction through Intel
CAT, it is possible that two addresses map to the same bank but
different rows and, thus, bit flips can be induced through single-
sided hammering. In fact, the attacker cannot know whether the
hammering was actually one-location hammering or single-sided
hammering. However, as long as a bit flip occurs, the attacker does
not care how many addresses mapped to the same bank. Finally,
depending on the actual parameters used by a fixed-open-page
policy, a row can still be closed early enough to induce bit flips.
6.4 Bit Flips induced by Nethammer
As described in Section 5.1, a bit flip can occur in user space or
kernel space leading to different effects depending on the memory it
corrupts. In this section, we present bit flips that we have observed
in our experiments and the effects they have caused.
Kernel image corruption and kernel crashes. We observed
Nethammer bit flips that caused the system not to boot anymore.
It stopped responding after the bootloader stage. We inspected
the kernel image and compared it to the original kernel image
distributed by the operating system. As the kernel image differed
blockwise atmany locations, we assume that the Nethammer caused
a bit flip in an inode of the file system. The inode of a program that
wanted to write data did not point to the correct file any longer but
to the kernel image and, thus, corrupted the kernel image.
Furthermore, we observed several bit flips immediately halting
the entire system such that interaction with it was not possible any
longer. By debugging the operating system over a serial connection,
we detected bit flips in certain modules such as the keyboard or
network driver. In these cases, the system was still running but did
not respond to any user input or network packets anymore. We also
observed bit flips that were likely in the SGX EPC region, causing
an immediate permanent locking of the memory controller.
Bit flips in user space libraries and executables. We observed
that bit flips crashed running processes and services or prevented
the execution of others as the bit flip triggered a segmentation fault
when functions of a library were executed. On one occasion, a bit
flip occurred either in the SSH daemon or the stored passwords
of the machine, preventing any user to login on the system. The
system was restored to a stable state only by rebooting the machine
and thus reloading the entire code from disk.
We also validated that an attacker can increase chances to flip
a bit in a target page by increasing the memory usage of a user
program. In fact, this was the most common scenario, overlapping
with our general test setup to detect bit flips for our evaluation. Un-
surprisingly, these bit flips equally occur when filling the memory
with actual contents that the attacker targets.
6.5 Target Row Refresh (TRR)
Previous assumptions on the Rowhammer bug lead to the conclu-
sion that only bit flips in the victim row adjacent to the hammering
rows would occur. While the probability for bit flips to occur in di-
rectly adjacent rows is much higher, Kim et al. [50] already showed
rows further away (even a distance of 8 rows and more) are af-
fected as well. Still, the hardware vendors opted for implementing
countermeasures focusing on the directly adjacent rows.
With the Low Power Double Data Rate 4 (LPDDR4) standard, the
JEDEC Solid State Technology Association [46] defines a reliability
feature called Target Row Refresh (TRR). The idea of TRR is to
refresh adjacent rows if the targeted row is accessed at a high
frequency. More specifically, TRR works with a maximum number
of activations allowed during one refresh cycle, the maximum active
count. Thus, if a double-sided Rowhammer attack (Section 2.2) is
mounted, and two hammered rows are accessed more than the
defined maximum active count, the adjacent rows (in particular the
victim row of the attack) will be refreshed. As the potential victim
rows are refreshed, in theory, no bit flip will occur, and the attack is
mitigated. However, in practice, bit flips can be further away from
the hammered rows and thus TRR may be ineffective.
With the Ivy Bridge processor family, Intel introduced Pseudo
Target Row Refresh (pTRR) for Intel Xeon CPUs to mitigate the
Rowhammer bug [55]. On these systems pTRR-compliant DIMMs
must be used; otherwise, the system will default into double re-
fresh mode, where the time interval in which a row is refreshed is
halved [55]. However, Kim et al. [50] showed that a reduced refresh
period of 32ms is not sufficient enough to impede bit flips in all
cases. While pTRR is implemented in the memory controller [54],
DRAM module specifications theoretically allow automatically run-
ning TRR in the background [58].
In our experiments, we were able to induce bit flips on a pTRR-
supporting DDR4 module using double-sided hammering on an
Intel i7-6700K. The bit flips occurred in directly adjacent rows and
rows further away. We observed that when using the same DDR4
DRAMon the Intel Xeon E5-1630 v4 CPU, no bit flips occurred in the
directly adjacent rows, but we observed no statistically significant
difference in the number of bit flips for the rows further away.
This indicates that TRR is active on the second machine but also
that TRR does not prevent the occurrence of exploitable bit flips in
practice. Thus, we conclude that the TRR hardware countermeasure
is insufficient in mitigating Rowhammer attacks.
7 COUNTERMEASURES
Since Nethammer does not require any attack code in contrast to
a regular Rowhammer attack, e.g., no attacker-controlled code on
the system, most countermeasures do not prevent our attack.
Countermeasures based on static code analysis aim to detect
attack code in binaries [43]. However, as our attack does not use
any suspicious code and does not execute a program, these counter-
measures do not detect the ongoing attack. Other countermeasures
detect on-going attacks using hardware- and software-based per-
formance counters [17, 18, 29, 31, 67, 91] and subsequently stop
the corresponding programs. However, when hammering over the
network, the large amount of memory accesses are executed by the
kernel itself, and the kernel cannot just be terminated or stopped
like a regular program. Hence, these countermeasures cannot cope
with our attack. Modifying the system memory allocator to hinder
the exploitability of bit flips [15, 28, 84] may generally work against
Nethammer. However, the hammering is in practice done by the
kernel, so the proposed isolation schemes are ineffective, and new
schemes have to be proposed.
ANVIL [9] uses performance counters to detect and subsequently
mitigate Rowhammer attacks. Since ANVIL, in its current form,
does not detect one-location hammering [27], it also does not detect
our attack. While we believe an adapted version of ANVIL could
detect our attack, it would require evaluating whether the false
positive and false negative rates allow for an application in prac-
tice. B-CATT [15] blacklists vulnerable locations, thus, effectively
reducing the amount of usable memory, but fully eliminating the
Rowhammer bug. B-CATT would work against Nethammer, but
previous work has found that it is not practical as it would block
too much memory [27, 50].
In general, we recommend reviewing any network stack and
network services code. Uncached memory and clflush instruc-
tions should only be used with extreme care, and it may even be
necessary to add artificial slow downs such that they cannot be
exploit for Nethammer attacks anymore. If this is not possible for
technical reasons, the threat model of the device should be revisited
and reevaluated. Mitigating our eviction-based Nethammer attack
might be more straight-forward, as it requires a specific configura-
tion for Intel CAT. Either avoiding the restriction to a low number
of cache ways via Intel CAT on network-connected systems or in-
stalling ECC memory would likely be sufficient to make our attack
very improbable to succeed. Hence, we also recommend using Intel
CAT very carefully in network-connected systems.
8 DISCUSSION
Hardware requirements. To induce the Rowhammer bug, one
needs to access memory in the main memory repeatedly and, thus,
needs to circumvent the cache. Therefore, either native flush in-
structions [87], eviction [4, 28] or uncached memory [84] can be
used to remove data from the cache. In particular, for eviction-
based Nethammer, the system must use Intel CAT as described
in Section 2.3 in a configuration that restricts the number of ways
available to a virtual machine in a cloud scenario to guarantee
performance to other co-located machines [40]. If none of these
capabilities are available over the network, an attacker could not
mount Nethammer in practice.
One limitation of our attack is that only DRAM susceptible to
bit flips can be exploited using a Rowhammer attack and, thus,
Nethammer. To reduce the risk of bit flips on servers, one would
assume that cloud providers tend to deploy ECC RAM usually.
However, many cloud providers offer to rent hardware without
ECC RAM [23, 33, 34, 63, 64, 85], potentially allowing Nethammer
attacks. DRAM with ECC can only be used in combination with
Intel Xeon CPUs and can detect and correct 1-bit errors. Therefore
it can deal with single bit flips. While non-correctable multi-bit flips
can be exploitable [5, 6, 51], they often end up in a denial-of-service
attack depending on the operating system’s response to the error.
Network traffic. Nethammer sends as many network packets to
the victimmachine as possible, aiming to induce bit flips. Depending
on the actual attack scenario (see Section 5), additional traffic, e.g.,
by enumerating the public keys of the service, is generated. If
the victim uses network monitoring software, the attack might
be detected and stopped, due to the highly increased amount of
traffic. In our experiments, we sent a stream of UDP packets with
up to 500Mbit/s to the target system. We were able to induce a bit
flip every 350ms and, thus, if the first random bit flip already hits
the target or causes a denial-of-service, the attack could already
be successful. However, as the rows are periodically refreshed, an
attacker only needs an extraordinary high burst of memory accesses
to a row between two refreshes, i.e., within a period of 64ms. Hence,
an attacker couldmount Nethammer for a few hundredmilliseconds
and then pause the attack for a longer time. These short network
spikes may circumvent network monitoring software that might
otherwise detect and prevent the on-going attack, e.g., by null
routing the victim server.
Gigabit LTE on Mobile Devices.
While ethernet adapters in mobile phones are uncommon, many
ARM-based embedded devices in IoT setups are equipped and con-
nected with gigabit ethernet. However, we expect the maximum
throughput of these network cards to be too low on many of these
devices, e.g., the Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ [24], and also WiFi chips
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typically offer too little capacity. However, on more recent proces-
sors, e.g., the Qualcomm Snapdragon 845 chipset [70], and modems
like the Qualcomm X20 Gigabit LTE modem, throughputs up to
1.2Gbit/s are possible in practice. This would enable to send enough
packets to hammer specific addresses to induce bit flips on the de-
vice and, thus, to successfully mount Nethammer.
Influence of DRAM Supply Voltage on Rowhammer Effect.
Kim et al. [50] identified voltage fluctuations as the root cause of
DRAM disturbance errors, e.g., the Rowhammer bug. However,
no study so far has investigated the direct effect of the DRAM
supply voltage on Rowhammer bit flips. In fact, we can already
observe a direct correlation between a low DRAM supply voltage by
reviewing related work. Figure 6 shows how the DRAM voltage has
been reduced over the past years. Previous work observed that the
vulnerability of DRAMmodules is related to themanufacturing date,
i.e., no bitflips before 2010 [50, 78]. However, as shown in Figure 6
there are at least two possible correlations with the Rowhammer
bug, the manufacturing date, and the supply voltage.
Indeed, Rowhammer has only been reported on DRAM modules
with a voltage below 1.5 volts [50, 78], i.e., DDR3 [50, 78], DDR4 [68],
LPDDR2 and LPDDR3 [84], and LPDDR4 [83].
We investigated the influence of the DRAM voltage on the oc-
currence of bit flips on two systems. We tested voltage increases
in 0.01V steps. On three tested systems (2× DDR4, 1× DDR3), we
observed no significant change in the number of bit flips, i.e., the
number of bit flips stayed in the same order of magnitude, even
when increasing the voltage by 0.2V. Future work should inves-
tigate whether other voltage-related parameters could lead to a
straightforward elimination of the Rowhammer bug.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented Nethammer, the first truly remote
Rowhammer attack, without a single attacker-controlled line of
code on the targeted system. We demonstrate attacks on systems
that use uncached memory or flush instructions while handling
network requests, and systems that don’t use either but are pro-
tected by Intel CAT. In all cases, we were able to induce multiple
bit flips per hour on real-world systems, leading to temporary or
persistent damage on the system. We showed that depending on the
location, the bit flip compromises either the security and integrity
of the system and the data of its users. In some cases, the system
was rendered unbootable after the attack.
We presented a method to automatically identify the page policy
used by the memory controller. Consequently, we found that adap-
tive page policies are also vulnerable to one-location hammering.
While we were able to mount the first one-location hammering
attack on an ARM device, the network capacity on this device was
too low for Nethammer.
Transforming formerly local attacks into remote attacks is al-
ways a landslide in security. Assumptions that were true for the
local scenario are largely invalid in a remote scenario. In particular,
all defenses and mitigation strategies were designed against local
Rowhammer attacks, i.e., remote Rowhammer attacks were out of
scope. Hence, Nethammer requires the re-evaluation of the security
of millions of devices where the attacker is not able to execute
attacker-controlled code. Finally, our work demonstrates that we
need to develop countermeasures with the root cause of both local
and remote Rowhammer attacks in mind.
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A KERNEL ACCESSES FOR NETWORK
PACKETS
Table 2 shows the results of the funccount script of the perf frame-
work [22] for functions with udp in their name while the targeted
system is flooded with UDP packets.
Table 2: Results of funccount on the victim machine for
functions with udp in their name while the system is
flooded with UDP packets.
Function Number of calls
__udp4_lib_lookup 2 000 024
__udp4_lib_rcv 1 000 012
udp4_gro_receive 1 000 012
udp4_lib_lookup_skb 1 000 012
udp_error 1 000 012
udp_get_timeouts 1 000 013
udp_gro_receive 1 000 013
udp_packet 1 000 012
udp_pkt_to_tuple 1 000 012
udp_rcv 1 000 012
udp_v4_early_demux 1 000 012
